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Michel Henry’s works contain two aspects, the one philosophical and the 
other literary. It is possible to look at his four novels as a personal 
entertainment, a hobby, even though his skill, in this domain also, was 
recognised by the Renaudot Academy. He seemed to confirm that his 
fictional attempts, by comparison with the composition of the treatises, were 
of minor importance in his eyes. Did he not confide that philosophical 
writing was for him a “very solitary and difficult task,” “As for ‘literary 
expression’—I have not worked in this domain,” he admitted, “I have a very 
immediate relationship to books—I could give myself up spontaneously, 
without taking care of anything, without setting myself problems…”?1 
However, , the present investigation will focus on the literary quality of his 
works of fiction..2 This approach is not contrary to his ideas on literary 
writing for three reasons. First, if Henry amused himself by writing stories, 
it is obvious that in spite of his statements he worked laboriously on his 
style, even if the results were uneven. Secondly, his novels are echoes of his 
treatises, sometimes repeating and radicalising their ideas. Thirdly, it is 
possible to disregard the content of these two aspects of his work, the 
conformity of themes in his literary and philosophical writings, and to 
examine the form which would allow us to base our understanding of his 
works of fiction on his philosophical system. We have this opportunity 
because he wrote about art, and in spite of the fact that he did not synthesise 
these two aspects of his works by writing an “aesthetics of the novel,”3 he 
intended to do so. We can try to understand the motives behind his literary 
practice by transposing into the realm of literature what he said about 
painting, in order to understand his novels as “literary works of art.” But we 
want to forestall a possible disappointment by warning that we will neither 
quote nor study his novels here. The reason for this choice is that this essay 
is intentionally philosophical. But to develop a “philosophy of literature” is 
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not an adequate answer, for it renews the submission of the latter to the 
former. To have an a priori idea of literature and to seek to justify it in the 
reading of poetic texts inevitably leads to a blindness to their specificity or 
style. We shall thus take as a starting point the definition that Henry gave in 
his essay on Kandinsky: “Because the truth of art is a transformation of the 
individual’s life, aesthetic experience contracts an indissoluble link with 
ethics. It is itself an ethics, a ‘practice’, a mode of actualizing life.”4 We shall 
explain the terms of this sentence in order to collect what is relevant for 
literary practice. 
To begin, we can immediately pose several questions about this phrase. 
First, does this idea of transformation mean that, in reading some works the 
reader experiences emotions that change his life forever, or does it mean that 
art is the processing of the author’s life into a novel? The idea of 
actualisation seems to lead the second interpretation. That said, perhaps we 
should not oppose these two views. What is the link then between aesthetics 
and ethics? Shall we return to an edifying conception of art, and is it not a 
case of “moral regression”? But he says that it is experience that is ethical. 
Hence, it can mean that works send a message, but also, that the artist at 
work may have a “spiritual” experience (to use the terminology of the 
inventor of abstraction), which allows him to find himself a unique ethics of 
life. Lastly, Henry employs the word “practice” in inverted commas to 
describe the aesthetic experience. Once more, the assumption that he spoke 
about the creator, the writer, seems to be confirmed. But if creation is 
indisputably a practice, like painting, sculpting, or writing, if it is 
manipulation of material (language in the case of literature), these material 
acts do not seem to involve an ethical experience. Therefore, we must admit 
that the transformation described in these lines does not take place within 
transcendence (between the work and the public, and beyond within the 
intersubjectivity of writer and reader), but within the immanence of the 
author’s subjectivity. Then how should we understand that this inner 
experience may be a practice at the same time? We can understand that it 
gives rise to practice, but only later. Reflecting innocently on this definition 
leads us to conclude that artistic practice merges with aesthetic experience, 
bringing transcendence to immanence, so to speak. To understand this new 
conception of practice (that caused him to use inverted commas), we must 
begin at the end of the sentence with the idea that aesthetic experience and 
practice are not only “a transformation of life” (une transformation de la vie), 
but “its actualisation” (sa réalisation). In French, this term does not refer to 
the traditional dichotomy which actuality forms with potentiality, but more 
simply to an “entry into reality,” for example “la réalisation d’un rêve” (the 
fulfillment of a dream), “la réalisation d’un film” (film making), and so on. 
Hence, it seems difficult to imagine that life may actualise itself (que la vie 
puisse se réaliser) in the form of an artistic practice. Would this not be to 
conclude that art is distinct from life? Is art not to be found within life? 
Obviously, the meaning of the inverted commas around “practice” is only 
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understandable if we admit that “life” must be conceived also in a particular 
sense. 
Back to Life Itself! 
We all believe that we know what life means because we are alive. But to be 
alive is not enough to know what life is. We are victims of an illusion. 
Because a living being needs to be alive to exist, we might agree that life 
boils down to existence. But they are not the same. Existence alone is not 
enough to know what life is. Worse still, in the present epoch, our bustling 
existence blinds us to the knowledge of life. Yet this knowledge is 
primordial, so much so that it seems as a “lost beginning.” This distinction, 
to which Henry attaches a lot of importance, gives him a singular place 
among the history of philosophy. His thought belongs to philosophies of 
immanence—from the great figures Spinoza and Nietzsche to 
contemporaries like Deleuze and Laruelle—as opposed to philosophies of 
transcendence like Heidegger’s. To underline the difference between life and 
existence, which founds the opposition of these two trends, let us remind 
that existentialists often write ek-sistence. For example, temporality if 
characterised by sequences that Heidegger calls “ecstasies” (Ekstasen)5, so 
practice, a central issue of this essay, is defined by him in terms of spatiality 
and temporality, that is to say, by its nature of ekstatikon, or transcendence. 
In the context of the French post-war years, when Henry began his carrer, 
the Gallicising “Ek-stase” has become a generic term to describe a manner to 
be at a distance from the self, and after all the transcendence. Thus, now that 
we have remembered this important dichotomy and its function in the 
cleavage of philosophy, we can return to our earlier question — what is 
“life” for Henry? — and shall examine Henry’s remark: “la vie . . . ignore 
l’Ek-stase.”6 What did he mean? What is, more precisely, the relationship 
between his conception of life and ek-sistence? 
Henry’s statement does not necessarily mean that “life . . . knows 
nothing about Ek-stasis,”7 but also that it ignores it. In other words, because 
life is prior to “the pre-objective dawning of the world and its ek-static 
emergence,”8 it knows them partly because it is their source. But above all, 
life has the possibility of knowing itself without resorting to the “mediation” 
of any “[F]ront”9 (Devant)10 or “Outside”11 (Dehors).12 Furthermore, life must 
resist the transcendence of the world and the scientistic objectivism which 
characterise our time of “barbarism.” The verb “ignorer” conveys more a 
meaning of rejection than of ignorance because the essence of life “excludes 
every exteriority from it, because it excludes every relation to the object, 
every intentionality, and every ek-stasis from itself.”13 However, this 
exclusion must not be understood as a reaction either, for life is primordial. 
The history of philosophy, phenomenology included, deludes us into 
believing that no thought is possible without objectivity and the 
intentionality that constitutes it. Thus, Henry’s system is not only the 
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denouncement of the predominance of “the mathematical science of 
nature”14 over all other forms of thought, but a criticism of philosophy that 
neglects this knowledge of life where it takes root. We should never forget 
that the expression “radical immanence,” which designates a source of the 
thought opposed to the transcendence of the ek-sistence, indicates that life is 
at the “root” (radix) of any philosophy. 
It would take too much time here to explain how Henry rediscovered 
life, starting from the problem of manifestation. But we must state that, as 
Husserl did, this revelation came from a rereading of the Cartesian 
revolution. A “non-intentional phenomenology” implies that we are 
deprived of the cogitatum, namely of an object and its objective qualities, by 
which we believe that only they can provide us with the abstract basis which 
enable us to think (cogitare). Henry’s approach is a certain return to a stage of 
knowledge prior to any thought. But how is this possible? This question in 
the form of a refusal shows our resistance, but Henry gets round this 
resistance by quoting an expression which he borrows paradoxically from 
the cogito’s father: “Sentimus nos videre.”15 It means indeed “‘we feel our 
seeing,’” that is to say that everybody is able to feel himself feeling, or, as 
Descartes said also, phrasing it with the favourite sense of the philosophers: 
“videor videre.”16 There are not only “sense data” rising from the 
immanence—the assumption of inner sensations could also give rise to 
discussion—but of emotions, the English “feeling” providing us with a more 
substantial confusion between “sensation” and “sentiment.” Henry names 
“auto-affection” this essential constituent of life, and Scott Davidson was 
well-advised to make this choice, which finally maintains the French word. 
For “self-affection,” as a copy of the Husserlian Selbstaffektion, would 
excessively introduce the idea of reflexivity. But that is precisely what not to 
do. If it is possible to conceive transcendence within immanence, we must 
do it with a kind of restraint, by attempting to control the mental and 
philosophical reflex that would make life a pure cogitatum. We shall not 
consent to the idea that existence was prior to life, transcendence to 
immanence. 
To keep the word “affection” was also a wise decision. Part of its history 
results from the confusion between three Latine verbs (afficere, affectare, 
affactare), but we would like to concentrate on one of them, adficere. It means 
“to put someone into a certain mood (rather negative),” but especially it 
gives two terms which are translations for the Greek: adfectio that 
corresponds to diathesis, at first “arrangement,” and adfectus to pathos, a 
“modification” resulting from an external influence. The French “affecter” 
and words of the same family conserve all these levels of meaning: activity 
(“affecter des crédits,” to allocate credits; “affecter quelqu’un à une 
fonction,” to appoint someone; the affectio societatis is even the will of legal 
personalities to associate them, as formulated in the Napoleonic Code); and 
passivity (“être affecté par un événement,” to be affected by an event; “avoir de 
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l’affection,” to feel affection; “affecter un sentiment,” to feign). But for 
philosophers, the idea of subjection is dominant in affection, and frequently 
linked with that of suffering (the Passion of Christ) and holding his 
corporeity (Les passions de l’âme, by Descartes). This digression allows us to 
better understand the peculiar reflexivity of auto-affection, that is to say, not 
only the fact, within immanence, that the “subject” does not turn into its 
proper “object,” but also, if we want to keep these terms, that the “subject” is 
firstly “dominated” by its “object.” Accordingly, Henry defines subjectivity 
as “pathetic,”17 which does not refer firstly to an idea of pity (even if the 
notion could prepare for it), but to the idea that, in accordance with the 
meaning of adfectus and affection, pathos (the term is highly frequent in his 
treatises) is the fundamental mechanism of immanence. But how do we 
understand this passivity, as sensation and sentiment are fused in this 
notion? 
Henry writes: “There is no seeing that does not experiences its seeing, 
no hearing that does not experience its hearing, no touching that does not 
immediately experience itself and does not coincide with itself in the very 
act by which it touches anything whatsoever.”18 It is at this level that 
reflexivity occurs and its “immédiateté” (which means it took place at the 
same time and without mediation) accounts for its radicalness. Now, at this 
stage, we are speaking only about sensations. But, in this end of the 
translation of Voir l’invisible, we have a good example, as we said before, of 
how, in English, the meaning naturally slips from the idea of sensation to 
that of emotion, when Henry sums up: “The ultimate power of feeling 
[pouvoir de sentir] . . . is the feeling [celui, sc. le pouvoir de sentir] in which this 
sensation [sensation] is immediately experienced.”19 In the French text, there 
is no idea of emotion, even if everyday sentences like “J’ai une drôle de 
sensation” or “Je ne me sens pas bien” keep the same ambiguity as feeling. But 
obviously, this wording is not inadequate, as English imposes it and 
anticipates Henry’s thought. To clarify, it is certain that sensation, or 
accurately the “auto-sensation,” and not the “self-sensation,” is peculiar to life. He 
noted, at the beginning of La barbarie: “Everything that has this marvellous 
property of feeling itself [se sentir soi-même] is alive, whereas everything that 
happens to lack it is dead.”20 But, inasmuch as sensations are essentially 
passive and determinate our conception of emotions, the auto-affection 
cannot be understood as “active” like other traditional reflexivities of 
philosophy (self-consciousness, self-knowledge, and so on). That is why life 
appears eventually as an “alienation,” within the meaning of servitude, the 
auto-affection being likened to a self-dependence. Henry expresses this idea 
outstandingly in the following passage: 
Inasmuch as it affects itself, feels itself, and experiences 
itself, life is completely passive in relation to its own 
being. It suffers itself and supports itself as something that 
it has neither sought nor posited, but as something that 
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happens and continues to happen as un-willed and 
nonposited by the self, and yet as that which it is, as what 
it constantly experiences as a self. Inasmuch as life in its 
essence turns out to be the suffering and supporting of 
oneself in a suffering (pâtir) stronger than freedom, it is 
not only pathos, the passion of oneself. It is also 
characterized as suffering.21 
But these words should not induce us to see Henry’s thought as essentially 
pessimistic. Certainly he criticises our time severely. But the idea of 
suffering, associated with the being of life, should not lead us to believe that 
for him the human condition is suffering. On the contrary, we can already 
say that, if life has for him a certain tragic side but not an exclusive nature, 
culture, including literature, appears to him as a way to exceed suffering. 
Indeed, Henry speaks about “the weight of life” (le poids de la vie).22 
Furthermore, we have to admit that in this instance he confuses life and 
existence, or uses these terms casually, as he employs the expression that 
seems synonymous: “le fardeau de l’existence” (the weight of existence).23 
Nevertheless, these words do not run counter to nor challenge what we said 
earlier, because Henry placed the last expression in inverted commas to 
show his reservation, and because a “fardeau” is heavier and seems external, 
applying more to transcendence than to immanence. Be that as it may, the 
weight designates what we called alienation: “It is the way in which life is 
completely passive with respect to itself, unable to separate itself from itself, 
and unable to escape from what is oppressive about its being.”24 And he 
adds: “Life undergoes this experience in a suffering that is stronger than any 
freedom and in a suffering of this suffering [la souffrance de ce subir].”25 Thus 
life appears as an unavoidable subjection, as “it is impossible for life to undo 
that with which its has been burdened, that is to say, itself.”26 So is there no 
way out? 
First of all, Henry’s lexicon brings also a more joyful dimension. He says 
that “the embrace of itself [l’étreinte de soi] is the essence of life.”27 So we 
could have a reading that tends to be superficial and “narcissistic,” as if 
“l’étreinte de soi” meant that everyone “embraces” oneself in the intimacy of 
being, as if “l’auto-affection” meant that life consists of loving oneself. This 
interpretation is acceptable, if we understand that it is suffering that 
produces enjoyment in the final analysis. Henry specifies that the pathos “is 
modalized in the terms of the fundamental phenomenological tonalities of 
suffering [souffrir] and joy [jouir].”28 Let us point out, that if the verb “jouir” 
means “to enjoy” in an elevated style, it is common in French to designate an 
orgasm. But it is true that earlier Henry prefered the dichotomy between “la 
Souffrance” (Suffering) and “la Joie” (Joy).29 But how does suffering become 
joy? This duality is fundamental. Suffering, in the meaning of passivity (this 
verb means also “to bear” in French), is “the way for life to take hold of its 
being and to enjoy itself.”30 So life is a “passage” or a “perpetual oscillation 
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from suffering to joy.” But this immanent motion is based on suffering and 
proceeds from the senses. The suffering of the being comes from the fact that 
it is “thrown into itself” (jeté en soi) and “driven back to itself” (acculé à soi).31 
But it has collateral effects. Of course, perception cannot be understood as a 
pure passivity, but also as an act. Now, “every act . . . has its real being in 
pathos and precisely in its own pathos.”32 Thus pathos is the “mover” of 
each act, as it is “exalted” by it and produces its “self-development.” We 
have now arrived at the core of life, “the fundamental law of the inversion of 
suffering into joy.” But two things in this thesis are particularly noteworthy. 
On the one hand, this inversion corresponds to the production of the act 
from pathos. On the other hand, this law applies particularly to senses, in 
the form of their “self-growth” (auto-accroissement). These reflections give us 
an interesting perspective on the passage, quoted in the introduction, that 
we shall analyse. We understood the growth and deployment of the senses 
from pathos which concern of course the sensitivity and sensibility needed 
for creation. But, at the same time, we see that each act comes from this 
pathetic subjectivity. Thus, the artistic practice is already understood as “a 
transformation of the individual’s life,” the genitive being objective, which 
means the same thing as “a mode of actualizing life.” This law of inversion and 
growth in the life is the law of the production of art and literature. We have now to 
study its tonalities and the values conveyed by this conception in Henry’s 
novels. 
The Necessity of Art 
This oscillation is not only a change of state, but coming initially from 
pathos, that is from the suffering as “souffrir” and “subir,” it is already, 
whatever may be produced with or by life, what animates life. It is, as Henry 
specifies, “the movement through which life tirelessly comes into oneself 
and arrives in the self in the conservation and growth of the self.”33 But, as 
usual, no translation is “acceptable,” because it forces to decisions which are 
necessarily unsatisfying and would require an annotation by translators 
who would complain in this way about the meanings they had to sacrifice. 
In French, on the one hand, the two verbs, as well as describing this 
movement of life, communicate also the idea of a difficulty “to reach into” 
(parvenir en), which perhaps accounts for suffering, and for fate, as life 
“befalls” (advient à). On the other hand, Henry writes that “la vie parvient en 
soi et advient à soi.” But does this not mean that “life reaches itself and befalls 
itself?” All the difficulty here is explained by the lack of a neutral pronoun in 
French and by the necessity to distinguish the impersonal nature of life from 
the subjectivity that it animates. And yet, English cannot make this 
distinction in the same way as French can. The most evident translation of 
“en soi” is “per se,” as in la “chose en soi” (Ding an sich, thing per se). So we 
ought to understand that life reaches into itself (en soi, en elle-même), and not 
into the self (dans le moi). Thus, it is a movement interior to life, it is the 
movement by which life manifests itself to itself; for from where should it 
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come, if it is not from itself? Fortunately, this shift in meaning does not 
matter because life is at the core of the self or subjectivity. But it does allow 
us to better understand the nature of this movement and of its later 
deployment. Our interpretation appears to be obvious by the end of the 
sentence with the “accroissement de soi” that has been rendered by “growth of 
the self,” as “auto-accroissement” has been translated by “self-growth.” But 
we should see, even if it appeared difficult to coin a neologism like “auto-
growth,” that we turn comprehension towards an interpretation that seems 
to contradict that which was suggested by “auto-affection.” This translator’s 
decision is somewhat removed from the original, but once again it is shrewd 
and anticipates the question to be examined in the following paragraph. 
What is the growth of life? It comes from this oscillation or movement, 
but more precisely from “need” (besoin). Need is at the core of life; it is what 
implies emptiness. But this emptiness cannot be filled, and furthermore it 
continues this need and increases it. Henry asserts that “subjectivity is 
entirely need.”34 But how do we link this need to growth? At first sight, we 
have two opposite movements, that is the growth of life, and subjectivity’s 
need, the genitive being subjective. But he also says: “Work or rather 
spontaneous activity is nothing other than the outgrowth of need and its 
fulfilment.” How can we consider that within activity, and probably within 
every practice, the outgrowth of need is its fulfilment? Is it not 
contradictory? To fulfil a need is to fill its emptiness. That is why the 
translator was right in rendering here “accroissement du besoin” by 
“outgrowth of the need,” and not simply by “growth,” as usual. The growth 
of life stays so to speak within immanence, and goes out only as instigation 
of needs. It is only then, with the entrance into transcendence, that needs are 
fulfilled and that the growth of life is identified with growth of the self. Only 
then does Henry allow himself to speak of an “auto-accroissement de la 
subjectivité”35 (self-growth of subjectivity),36 because, at that point, and not 
before, the growth of life has become a deployment of life. It is at this 
moment that work appears, as we have said, but also every practice, and 
especially the work of art. Indeed, Henry considers that artistic practice, as 
constituting an essential part of culture, is the most spontaneous and 
primeval of all practices, and appears precisely at this moment when the 
growth of life becomes the outgrowth of the subject, which is the occasion of 
a modification of the fulfilment of the need, but also, of an 
“individualisation of the life,” as the works are unique to the person. He 
captures this with the phrase: “Toute culture porte le besoin dans 
l’accroissement.”37 It does not only mean that “Every culture has the need to 
grow,”38 but that the culture, and every practice which is linked to it, turns 
need into outgrowth, and that, in return, the deployment of culture grows its 
“vital need.” So what is culture for Henry and how does it appear as a 
practice of life? 
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Henry gives us this definition: “Culture is the set of enterprises and 
practices in which the overflowing of life is expressed. All of them are 
motivated by the ‘burden’ [la “charge”], the ‘too much’ that prepares living 
subjectivity internally as a force ready to be dispensed and required to act 
under this burden.”39 We have already said that life is burdened with itself, 
and that this first meaning is linked to the weight of life. But there is also an 
idea of a “charge” in this sentence, confirmed by the word “force” and by a 
reflection upon energy in the following lines. In any case, the principle here 
is that the growth of life leads to its “overflowing,” or rather 
“overabundance” (surabondance). It is our understanding that when there is 
an “overflow” of life, it “flows into the transcendence” as an act (“to act”). 
But of course, culture is not only an outlet, the result of a simple mechanism. 
Culture is linked to life, as the two share the same being40 and “becoming” 
(devenir),41 which is the growth of life. So certainly culture gives to life the 
license to fulfill (licence de s’accomplir),42 and, as its fulfilment obviously suits 
its being and is to grow, it is “the self-realization of life through its self-
growth.”43 But it is not simply an indirect consequence of life into 
transcendence, and the practice cannot be explained from this 
understanding. It is not an exit out of the reflexivity of auto-affection, 
whether it was an aim or a consequence, but it is an integral part of this 
process, as culture is the “action [of life] on itself.”44 More clearly stated: 
“Every culture is a culture of life [culture de la vie], in the dual sense whereby 
life is both the subject and the object of this culture. It is an action that life 
exerts on itself and through which it transforms itself insofar as life is both 
transforming and transformed.”45 Thus culture is still caught in the reflexivity 
of life as its “auto-transformation,” and the expression “culture de la vie” 
must be understood both as an objective and a subjective genitive: life 
produces culture by its overflowing, but, in return, culture transforms and 
improves life. But if this is so, we have two problems to resolve. First, as 
culture becomes identified with the auto-transformation of life, its reflexivity 
could be understood as some “experiments” about it. But not only would 
this practice imply a necessarily ek-static46 “decision” that would go against 
the first assertion that life ignores ek-stasis, but it would also be impossible 
as “no action on feeling is possible.” So this interpretation must be rejected. 
Secondly, if Henry maintains the idea of an action of life, it is in a very 
special sense. This action, as he says, will not be an “objective process,” but 
“outside of the world.” Hence we understand what the culture for life is and 
what its action on it is. Culture permits life to experience itself and its “own 
Basis.” But we cannot see how culture, characterised as life by the “total 
passivity” (passivité foncière) of any action relating to it, could produce 
practices such as art and literature. 
If this question of the “passivity of action” is of concern, it is not only 
because of its obvious antinomy, but also because it renders 
incomprehensible the idea of an aesthetic experience of a practice (though an 
experience that can no longer be conceived as an experiment seems merely 
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passive, and though “practice” was surrounded with inverted commas). 
Rather than persisting in understanding the mode of deployment of that 
transcendence, let us consider differently what culture is, otherwise called 
“culture of life,” in comparison with this “knowledge of life,” which we 
talked about at the beginning of this article. The latter was defined initially 
as the “original knowledge of the self,”47 that is, as innate and personal. But 
Henry asserts later: “I call ‘praxis’ the knowledge of life, as a knowledge in 
which life is at once the power that knows and what is known by it.”48 We 
find again the reflexivity of life, which conflicts, in this particular case, with 
the traditional and dialectical opposition between pathos and praxis. 
Moreover, Henry does not only consider that this confusion is peculiar to the 
knowledge of life, but he also criticises our age for no longer being capable 
of conceiving knowledge as action. Our scientific age (whose “spiritual” 
drift is not a decline, concretely speaking, this drift corresponds to our 
incapacity to ignore ek-stasis) not only denies pathos, but misunderstands 
praxis. With Modernity, “action has become objective,”49 and this mistake is 
not only characteristic of our time, but of Westerners who always interpret 
action “as an externalization and a real objectivation.”50 On the contrary, 
Henry says: “Action . . . is only the actualization of the primitive power of 
this phenomenological body,” that is to say “life,” and, as life is now 
identified with subjectivity, “action is only possible in and through 
subjectivity as a praxis.”51 This does not simply mean that action ought not 
to be conceived as objective, but that it is never objective, and that only the 
life is able to put something into practice: “action involves this essential 
immediation of life . . ., so much so that life only is able to act.”52 For our 
present purposes, this means first that of course any knowledge is not 
action, but that the knowledge of life is necessarily action: “When the knowledge 
that regulates action is knowledge of life, life coincides with action and is 
nothing but its auto-affection.”53 But secondly, as any culture is the culture 
of life and as the culture of life is obviously based on the knowledge of life, 
every culture is necessarily practice: “Inasmuch as culture is the culture of life 
and rests on this type of knowing, it is essentially practical.”54 Hence, as 
“every culture is essentially practical,”55 let us try to identify these “practices 
of life” that we call “culture.” 
We have said that subjectivity is entirely need. Henry tells us that, 
among these needs some, are “higher needs, which result from the nature of 
the need,”56 and that they “give rise” to “developed forms,” “higher forms”57 
or “fundamental forms of all culture.”58 What are they? They form a triad, 
which he treats regularly: art, ethics and religion. Through it the movement 
that we described previously occurs. In other words, these “traditional 
modes of culture”59 provide the “only possible knowledge . . . as life’s 
experimentation with itself”60 (which means that there is definitively no 
other knowledge) and realise life by favouring its growth. Thus it ensues 
from what has been said that these three forms of culture are “also practical 
knowledge.” Thus, now we know in which meaning the aesthetic experience 
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is a “practice,” it remains, in our effort to explain the quotation with which 
we started, to understand why it corresponds to one of the forms that 
compose the triad, that is ethics, and why ethics contracts an indissoluble 
link with the arts. 
It is not at all surprising that art was one of the three forms of culture, 
but it is more unexpected and apparently shocking to find ethics on his list. 
Nevertheless, Henry situates culture and ethics at the same “ontological 
site,”61 and insists: “Ethics by itself is co-extensive with culture, if it is the 
case that every living act, including the theoretical, is a practical act, a mode 
of ethos. As such it is derived from an axiological appreciation.”62 In his 
conception, ethics is thus not a set of norms, which would apply to acts and 
would be traditionally separated from practice as theory, but, as it is co-
extensive with culture, and as culture is necessarily practice, “it shows itself 
to be co-extensive with life and its full development.”63 Nor does this mean 
that ethics is reduced to practice, unless we have in mind its new sense 
inherited from life. Indeed, if Henry dares to advance this definition: “Ethics 
is the theory of action,”64 it is to reassert immediately that only life can act. 
So how can ethics be practical and theoretical as well? He specifies: “The 
task of ethics . . . is . . . to understand why there is a teleology immanent in 
life, and how it is life which decides its own action.”65 The knowledge of life 
“is constituted by all the modes of individual life,” and these modes “are a 
habitus that obeys a typology, or to put it better, a style.”66 Thus the term 
“ethics” must be understood literally as resulting from the ethos. It is 
constituted by the customs of life, which show, as works composing our 
heritage, that we have a knowledge of life, or rather a wisdom of life. Ethics 
comes as a heritage which offers to grasp the purposes of life, and 
accompanies it as practice. So aesthetics must be understood as ethics. For 
Henry, aesthetics does not direct the artistic practice more than, for example, 
ethics the medical deontology. We can even say that ethics, in its meaning of 
ethos, is the most important of the three forms of culture, for it is the most 
linked to the practices of life. It could be conceived as a “teleology immanent 
in art.” Let us now consider how art is a practice of life under the mode of 
ethics. 
How can we explain the usefulness and very existence of art in Henry’s 
philosophy? Certainly it belongs to culture, which is a practice. But are the 
two others, religion and especially ethics, not enough? The last is a teleology 
stemming from the habitus and accompanying the development of the life. 
What explains that life needs this higher form of culture, which is perhaps 
not more sensitive than religion, for instance, but works with sensitiveness 
as a material? For Henry, the ek-sistence of art discloses the one inadequacy of life. 
He expounds on it: 
Life, by its essence and the will of its innermost being, is 
never ex-posed or dis-posed in the ek-static Dimension of 
phenomenality, that is, in the appearance of the world. 
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That is why it does not display its own reality in the 
world, but only is represented in it, in the form of an irreal 
representation and a ‘simple representation.’67 
This precise explanation repeats the duality of meaning of our first 
description of life: “La vie ignore l’ek-stase.” We clearly see that art meets the 
“will” of life, but above all its impossibility (“its essence”) to enter 
transcendence. What are then the modalities of its deployment in the shape 
of the artistic practice? Henry defines the work of art as the “auto-affection 
of the ek-stasis of Being.”68 This means that the source of art stays in the 
immanence, that its “site” remains the “subjectivity itself.” What then is its 
action in the world? How does it “auto-affect” ek-stasis? In Henry’s view of 
our “entering into barbarism,”69 art plays a major part, as it resists to “the 
exclusion of sensibility from the lifeworld,”70 to the work of science, which 
“leaves sensibility aside” (fait abstraction de la sensibilité).71 To do this, it 
composes an imaginary world whose finality is “to produce more intense 
and determined sentiments.”72 So the auto-affection that was at the core of 
the radical immanence is thus transferred into the transcendence, so much 
so that the artistic practice, and its result when it is perceived, consist “of the 
self-growth of the subjectivity.”73 In fact, art “gives expression to sensibility 
and investigates its most meaningful accomplishments,”74 art is the most 
genuine expression of life. 
What is the conception of literature that emerges from this reading of 
Henry’s philosophy? By showing the function of the work of art in relation 
to the central concept of life, we can reconstruct his idea of literature. We 
have seen that the only beings that experience the feeling of themselves are 
alive, and that life is not only this auto-affection, but an alienation, or, as 
Henry better said, on the sole real occasion when he expressed himself about 
literary creation, life only feels itself in a “pathetic crush on itself” (un 
écrasement sur soi pathétique).75 It is this condition that causes all practices, 
amongst which art is the most refined. Thus life is an affect that produces a 
force that can turn against itself until its destruction (that is what he calls 
“barbarism”), but life can also reach its fulfilment, that is to say that this 
force, not being destructive but creative, affects the ek-stasis with the 
sentiment and the sensation that constitute itself. Then life causes arts 
through artists, and novels, as poetry, are also the results of this process. 
Indeed Henry says: “Literature has no other intention than to carry out the . . 
. disclosure of the essence of life, and if it does so by means of aesthetic 
processes, this is because art, to which it belongs, is the privileged vehicle for 
this essential relation to life.”76 This statement confirms the validity of our 
method, which has been to consider the novel as a literary work of art and to 
precede its literary study by this philosophical introduction. It remains to be 
seen if his own novels are this expected expression of life or narration of 
pathos.77 
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